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Information Theoretic Bounds on Authentication
Systems in Query Model
Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Peter R. Wild

Abstract—Authentication codes provide message integrity guarantees in an information theoretic sense within a symmetric key
setting. Information theoretic bounds on the success probability of
an adversary who has access to previously authenticated messages
have been derived by Simmons and Rosenbaum, among others.
In this paper, we consider a strong attack scenario where the adversary is adaptive and has access to authentication and verification oracles. We derive information theoretic bounds on the success
probability of the adversary and on the key size of the code. This
brings the study of unconditionally secure authentication systems
on a par with the study of computationally secure ones. We characterize the codes that meet these bounds and compare our result
with the earlier ones.
Index Terms—A-codes, authentication system, unconditional security, verification oracle.

I. INTRODUCTION

U

NCONDITIONALLY secure authentication systems
provide message integrity when the adversary’s computational power is unknown or unlimited. Unconditional security is
particularly important when recent advances in quantum computing and prospect of discovery and realization of efficient
algorithms for solving “hard” problems, is taken into account.
In an authentication code (A-code) [1], [10], authenticated
messages (ciphertexts) encode states of an information source
(referred to as plaintexts or source states) by a mapping determined by the shared key (also called the encoding rule).
A-codes are symmetric key systems. The receiver verifies the
authenticity of a message using the same key as the sender. In
a spoofing attack of order , a message-observing adversary
observes authenticated messages transmitted by the sender
and then tries to construct a fraudulent message called the
spoofing message that will be accepted by the receiver. We do
not make any assumptions about the computational power of
an adversary.
The performance of an A-code is measured by the probability
that the spoofing message is accepted by the receiver. Information theoretic bounds [10], [7], [6] for A-codes give fundamental
limits on performance of the codes. Rosenbaum [7] and Pei [6]
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independently derived a bound on the success probability of attackers in spoofing of order and employed the bound to derive
a lower bound on the key size of A-codes. Extensions and alternative derivations of these bounds are given by a number of
authors such as [2] and [4].
We extend this analysis by considering adversaries that may
be proactive in gathering information. The adversary might obtain information from the sender by having the sender transmit
a message corresponding to source state of the adversary’s
choosing or might obtain information from the receiver by
sending a message of the adversary’s choosing and observing
whether or not the receiver accepts it. Safavi-Naini et al. [8]
have considered A-codes with such an adversary in the context
of unconditionally secure digital signature schemes (USDS)
[9]. This situation, the query model, is modeled in terms of an
authentication oracle (A-oracle) that provides the authenticated
message corresponding to a query source state (an A-query) in
the same way that the sender would and a verification oracle
(V-oracle) that provides a response accept or reject to a query
message (a V-query) depending on if the receiver would or
would not accept the message. This terminology parallels
that used for schemes relying on computational security. An
attack with access to an A-oracle corresponds to an adaptive
chosen plaintext attack, and an attack with access to a V-oracle
corresponds to an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.
In this paper, we study unconditionally secure A-codes (symmetric key) under the query model and derive information theoretic bounds on the success probability of a query attacker.
A. Our Results
We consider an adversary who asks exactly queries, observing the responses of the oracle, and then spoofs. We analyze
this via an experiment in which the adversary uses a strategy to
choose each query adaptively, taking into account all queries
and responses previously observed.
1) Bounds on Success Probability: We derive information
theoretic bounds on the success probability of the adversary in
a general query, response attack model. This can be seen as a
generalization of the Rosenbaum–Pei lower bound [7], [6] for
spoofing of order .
2) Constructing Pure Optimal Strategies: An adversary’s
success chance is maximized when he uses an optimal strategy.
Finding optimal strategies requires solving a constrained maximization problem, taking into account all possible sequences
of query and responses, and it results in an adversary strategy
that is represented by a sequence of probability distributions.
We show that there always exists an optimal strategy for which
each of these probability distributions has the property that there
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is a unique element with nonzero probability. Such a strategy is
called pure and we give a recursive algorithm that constructs
this pure optimal strategy.
3) Queries Do Not Decrease Success Chance: It is known
that an adversary’s expected chance of spoofing may decrease if
the adversary observes a message, compared with his expected
chance of spoofing when he spoofs without any observation. A
natural question, noting the adversary’s control on the choice of
the query, is whether it is always beneficial to the adversary to
ask a query if possible. We show that as long as there are “good”
queries, asking them will not reduce the average success chance
(it may improve it) and so they should be asked. Thus, there is
no requirement for the adversary to compute the probabilities in
order to make a decision on whether to query in each particular
case. In particular, in the case of verification queries for nontrivial schemes, it is always a better strategy to ask the query
and then spoof than to spoof without querying.
4) Bounds on Key Entropy: In the case of authentication
queries, we use the bound on the probability of success to derive
a bound on the entropy of the key space. We establish a combinatorial characterization of the authentication schemes attaining
the bound which shows that optimal codes in the authentication
query model are also optimal codes in the message observing
model.
II. DEFINITIONS
A symmetric key authentication system provides integrity
guarantees for two parties, referred to as the sender and the
receiver, that share a secret key.
A (symmetric) authentication system consists of two algoand is defined over three sets , , and
rithms
, called plaintexts (or source state), ciphertexts (or message),
and keys, respectively. The authentication algorithm
takes a key and a plaintext and generates a ciphertext .
We consider authentication systems without splitting in which
a key and a message determine a single ciphertext and the alis a one-to-one function. (For authentication sysgorithm
determines a subset of .) The
tems with splitting a pair
takes a key and a ciphertext
verification algorithm
and returns a single bit .
is defined in terms of
as follows:
if
, for some
and
, otherwise. We have that, for all
and
, it holds that
. We
may also define a decryption function
, which satisfies
for all
and
.
The sender and the receiver use a probability distribution
over to select a secret key. To send a source state
to
the receiver, is encoded under to produce message
. The probability distribution
is called the communicants’ strategy and is assumed to be public. The sender uses
the key to authenticate a sequence of plaintexts arising from the
source according to a specified probability distribution, also assumed to be public, and transmits the corresponding sequence
of ciphertexts to the receiver. The probability distributions on
and together determine a probability distribution on
given by
. A ciphertext
is valid for
if and only if
.
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the random variables on sample
We denote by , , and
, respectively, corresponding to these
spaces , , and
probability distributions. We assume that the source produces
of distinct source states so that
a sequence
, the probability that the next source state is
given that the sequence
has arisen so far, is if
.
An authentication code can be represented by a matrix with
columns labeled by the messages and
rows labeled by
the encoding rules. The entry in row and column is
if
and otherwise. Alternatively, we may define
its encoding matrix. This matrix has
columns labeled by the
rows labeled by the encoding rules. The
source states and has
. The
entry in row and column is the message
and has exactly
set of elements in row is denoted
distinct messages. Thus, for an encoding rule , a message is
.
valid if and only if
It is assumed that the adversary knows the encoding matrix
but does not know the actual secret encoding rule agreed upon
by the sender and the receiver.
A. Adversaries and Success Probability
The traditional adversary model for an authentication code is
an adversary who has access to authenticated messages and
attempts to construct a forged message (also called a spoofing
message) that would be accepted by the receiver. The best sucof the adversary in the above attack gives a
cess probability
measure of the security provided by the code.
Simmons [10] derived an information theoretic bound on the
(an impersonation
success probability of a spoofer when
attack). Rosenbaum [7] and Pei [6] independently derived a general form of the bound for
(1)
denotes a random variable associated with the sewhere
quence of observed messages
.
The bound can be used to derive an information theoretic
bound on the entropy or uncertainty (and hence the length) of
.
the key in terms of the success probabilities
1) Adversary With Oracle Access: In [8], the adversary
model was strengthened by the addition of access to authentication and verification oracles. This new adversary is adaptive
and can ask authentication and verification queries from corresponding oracles. The oracles produce responses to queries in
the same way that the legitimate sender and receiver would.
, an authentication oracle
(also
For a given
,
called a signature oracle) takes as input a source state
computes
, and returns response .
receives as input a ciphertext
A verification oracle
, computes
, and returns response .
We use to denote a query (either an A-query or a V-query
) and use to denote a response (either or ). We denote the
set of queries by and the set of responses by . Thus,
and
for A-queries and
and
for
V-queries. Let
denote a sequence of elto denote the set
. For
ements. We also use
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, we say is a prefix of if
. We use
,
, , , and
to denote a sequence of source states,
messages, queries, responses, and query and response pairs, respectively. A strategy of an adversary is a collection of probability distributions that is used to select the queries and also
is a sequence of query and
the final spoofing query. If
denotes the probability that is
response pairs, then
chosen as the next query (or spoofing message) given that the
of queries and observed
adversary has asked the sequence
the sequence of responses. An adversary’s strategy is a col.
lection of probability distributions
be an adversary that has access to
Let
both oracles and uses a strategy to adaptively ask A-queries
(receiving the response after each query) and then ask a
be an adversary that has access to
V-query. Let
only a verification oracle and uses a strategy to adaptively ask
verification queries (receiving the response after each query)
and then ask a further verification query.
Consider the following experiments.

the experiment is one instance of the communicants’ strategy
and the adversary’s choices in his attack, and corresponds to
a sample point in a probability space where sample points are
labeled with a key (the communicants’ choice) and the adver,
,
sary’s sequence of query and response pairs
where is the sequence of responses to the sequence of queries
( or
) and
. Let
denote the
probability of the sample point with label ,
. For the
sample points in which the forgery is considered successful the
experiment results in .
We compute the advantage of the forgers in the previous experiments as the probability of the experiment resulting in

This is the average success probability over all keys (with
respect to the distribution given by the communicants’ strategy)
for
when the adversary uses strategy . We use the notation
either of these quantities. This can be written as

Experiment

after asking exactly queries

of

and receiving corresponding responses
makes a query

to

such that the return

the oracle

, and

The advantage function of is the advantage of a forger with
the highest success probability

had never been returned by
the oracle
return

return

Experiment

after asking exactly queries

of

and receiving corresponding responses
makes a query
the oracle

to

such that the return
, and

was never asked of
the oracle
return

The strategy of a forger with this advantage is called an optimal
for either of these quantities.
strategy. We write
We say that a key is consistent with a query and response
pair
if the following holds: 1) if
, then it
; and 2) if
,
holds that
. Let
denote the
then it holds that
set of keys that are consistent with a query response sequence
. The conditional probability
that the key
is
is given the sequence of query and response pairs
. Similarly, for
, let
nonzero only if
. For
, we put
if
and
; and
, otherwise.
is chosen by commuIn the following, we assume
nicants and is unknown to the adversary. We introduce some
notation that records probabilities of certain events in the experiments described previously. Put

return

The output of the experiment is a random variable
(
or
on
) corresponding to
the success or failure of an adversary who makes queries to an
oracle before spoofing with a (forged) message . Each run of

(2)
where
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is the conditional probability that
is the response to query
given that
is the sequence of responses to the sequence
. This is the probability in the previous experiof queries
as the prefix to their
ments of the instances that have
label. This probability may be calculated from the communi, the adversary’s strategy , and the authencants’ strategy
tication system . This probability satisfies the following recursion:

(3)
Put

This is the probability that the spoofing message
. Then
given the sequence

(4)
is successful

(5)
Put
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Theorem 3.1: There always exists a pure optimal strategy for
an authentication system adversary who has oracle access.
Proof: We prove the theorem by constructing a pure
strategy that is optimal. Let the adversary have oracle queries
of this
and a single spoofing query. Given any strategy
adversary, we show how to construct a pure strategy whose
advantage is at least that of , using recursive steps. Towards this end, we recursively determine strategies
such that the advantage of an adversary with strategy
is at
least that of an adversary with strategy ; the advantage, for
, of an adversary with strategy
is at least that
of an adversary with strategy
; and
is pure for all
,
. Since is pure, this will establish our
claim by taking to be an optimal strategy.
will differ from only in the distributions
Now
used to choose the spoofing message. Thus, we are considering
instances with labels whose sequences of queries and responses
. For each
, let
be such
have a given prefix
that

(8)
(and , otherwise). Thus, the
Put
strategy
is a pure strategy that chooses the spoofing
, put
for all
message optimally. For
.
Hence,
is a strategy that is identical to except that each
is a special probability distribution with nonzero proba.
bility only corresponding to an optimal spoofing query
Note that from (2), we have
for all
. Also note that from (8), we have

and
for all

so that

(6)
This is the conditional probability in the previous experiments
that the instances with labels whose sequences of queries and
output .
responses are prefixed by
For each
, the advantage of the adversary may be
written
(7)
We write

to denote the maximum of

over all strategies

.

where the last equality uses (5).
Now

III. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
The adversary’s strategy is a collection of probability distributions
that are used to choose queries. We say that
is pure if there is a unique query, denoted
, with
(so that
for all other queries
). We say that a strategy is pure if
is pure for each
.

and the probability of success using strategy
using .

is at least that

2430

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. 54, NO. 6, JUNE 2008

For

, we recursively define assuming
are defined. Now
will differ from
only in
. That is, for all
, we
the distributions
for all
,
, and
have
so these strategies are pure. In this step,
is replaced by
.
a pure distribution such that
Consider instances with labels whose sequences of queries
.
and responses have prefix
, let
be such that
For each

A. Bounds on Success Probability
We consider an adversary that uses strategy to make
queries (either A-queries or V-queries) to an oracle and then
is the probaconstructs a spoofing query. Now
bility that the resulting sequence of query and response pairs
. We write
to denote a random variable
is
with respective probabilities
that takes the values
. The source distribution and the communicants’
on . Let
strategy determine a distribution
be the probability that a message is transmitted by the sender
as the next message given the sequence of query and response
.
pairs
Theorem 3.2: Let be an authentication system and let
be the probability of success of an adversary who spoofs optimally after making oracle queries using strategy . Then

(9)
Put

(and , otherwise). For
, put
for all
. Then, from (2), we have
for all

. Also note

that from (9), we have

for all

so that

Now

and the probability of success using strategy
is at least that
using
.
The strategy is a pure strategy and is optimal if is optimal.
and
We have

and

is an optimal spoofing message. Moreover, for each
, we have
and

Moreover, equality holds if and only if, for all
with
and all
with
, we have
and
constant for all
.

is

The proof of Theorem 3.2 is given in the Appendix. It is an
adaptation of the proof of Theorem 3.1 of Rosenbaum [7]. This
bound is analogous to Rosenbaum’s bound for a message-observing adversary, with the difference being that the distribution
depends on both
associated with the random variable
the adversary’s and the communicants’ strategies while in the
message observing case it is determined by the communicants’
strategy and the source state distribution. This means that unlike the case of a message observing adversary where the best
that he
success chance is bounded by the quantity
cannot change, the case of an adaptive adversary with access
to query oracles allows him to influence
and so have a higher bound on the success chance. The bound
depends on the query strategy and applies to any spoofing
strategy. For good authentication systems, the best spoofing
strategy should meet the bound with equality.
As in [7], we have the following generalization. Let the values
for
,
and sequence
of
query and response pairs be a joint probability distribution on
such that, if
,
and, for all
and
,
then
, the probability that
the encoding rule is and, for strategy , the sequence of
. We write
to denote a
query and response pairs is
with respective
random variable that takes values
probabilities
. The bound
in Theorem 3.2 becomes

(10)
B. Authentication Queries
Thus,

is an optimal query.

When the adversary has access to an authentication oracle,
the sample points have labels with sequences of queries and
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responses of the form
, and the probability of
output for a given sequence of queries and responses is given
by

Now
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is the distribution used by

query
of the
bution satisfying

. The random variable

for selection
has distri-

where

is the set of keys that satisfy
. Theorem 3.2 in its generalized form [expression (10)] can be written as follows.

Theorem 3.3: Let be an authentication system and let
be the probability of success of an adversary who uses strategy
and spoofs optimally after making oracle queries. Then

Moreover, equality holds if and only if, for all
with
and all
, we have
is constant for all

with
and
.

1) Bound on the Key Size: We prove a bound on the key
for an adversary
size in terms of the probabilities of success
that has access to authentication queries,
. Let
be a strategy such that for all
,
, we have
whenever
. We define
adversaries
,
, with strategies
where
. For
,
uses strategy
to ask oracle queries and then uses an optimal spoofing
,
strategy that gives him the best success chance. For
for all
,
. Note
define
that
is the probability distribution used by
to select
,
the spoofing message. Also note that for all
for sethe probability distribution used by the adversary
, is the same as the probability
lecting queries ,
.
distribution used by the adversary
The lower bound on the success probability of
is

where
denotes the random variable that takes
with probability
and
is a
values
random variable that has the properties described at the end
, we have
of Section III-A. Since
.
Let

where
and
, otherwise. This
, keys
is the distribution on query and response pairs
, and transmitted messages , which arises when the source
. Then,
, if
state distribution is
.

and

Thus,
satisfies the conditions on
end of Section III-A, and we have

described at the

where

has the same distribution as responses to query
by the adversary
.
Equivalently, the inequality may be written as

Theorem 3.4: Let

be an authentication system. Then

Proof: For adversaries
viously, we have

,

, as described pre-

Note that

and since

, we have

2432

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. 54, NO. 6, JUNE 2008

Hence

Let

. Then, it follows that

.

Theorem 4.1: Let be a strategy of an adversary who asks
oracle queries and then constructs a spoofing query for an authentication system . Suppose that the adversary modifies the
strategy to ask one extra oracle query and then spoof optimally.
Then, an extra query is good if it is distinct from previous
queries and the following occurs: 1) in the case of verification
queries, is distinct from the unique optimal spoofing message
for strategy should one exist; and 2) in the case of authentication queries, there exists an optimal spoofing message for
strategy such that any key consistent with the previous query
.
and response pairs is not consistent with
If there exists a good extra query for every sequence of query
and response pairs arising from , then for a suitable modifica.
tion, the adversary’s probability of success is at least
Proof: Suppose that the adversary has observed the seof query and response pairs.
quence
The expected success probability of the adversary after anis
other query

IV. “GOOD” QUERIES DO NOT DECREASE
SUCCESS PROBABILITY
It is well known that for a message observing adversary, observing an extra message may reduce the success probability
of the adversary. For example, Massey [3] defined onefold secure A-codes as codes that provide perfect protection against
spoofing of order and . For such codes with source states
and
. Moreover,
and messages, we have
the probability of success in spoofing of order is for each
spoofing message and the probability of success in spoofing
of order is
for each observed message
and spoofing
. Thus, for these codes, observing any mesmessage
sage will reduce the success probability of the adversary.
The passive message observing adversary obtains information from valid messages sent across the channel. On the other
hand, the active querying adversary obtains information from
the responses to the queries. Thus, there is a difference: in the
latter, the adversary can control the amount of information that
he receives.
Since adversaries with oracle access have some control of
the information that they receive a natural question is whether
asking queries is always helpful to such adversaries. For every
query, the adversary may calculate his best success chance before and after the query is asked and choose the one that gives
him the higher success chance. Of course, the probability of success is unchanged if the adversary repeats a query that has been
made before, so we only need to consider the case where the
adversary makes distinct queries. We call a query “good” if it is
distinct from previous queries and if asking it will not reduce the
success chance of the adversary. Otherwise, a query is “bad.” In
the following, we show that the adversary only needs to look for
“good” queries and if there is one then he can be guaranteed that
asking the query will not decrease his success chance.
The following theorem gives conditions under which a query
is good. It follows that, in all but those special cases where no
query satisfies these conditions, asking another query is helpful
and the adversary’s probability of success is at least as great
with the extra query.

where
the conditional probability that the response is
sequence
and the query
. However

is
given the

so this is

where
or
.
is distinct from
and the folSuppose that
, then there exists
lowing occurs: 1) if
with
,
, then under any key
, there
and 2) if
with
and
exists a message
.
With so defined, we have

and so

Thus,

is a good query.
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It follows immediately that if there exists a good extra query
for every sequence of query and response pairs arising from
, then the adversary’s probability of success for a modified
strategy that chooses such a query with probability is at least
and the result follows.

and we have

Note that for verification queries the condition for existence
of a good query is nearly always satisfied. The exception is when
and so the only available query is the spoofing
, there will be a good query and
query. As long as
so the success chance of the adversary would not be reduced if
that query is asked. Note, however, that there is no guarantee
that the success chance will be improved by asking a query.
For example, in the onefold secure A-codes of Massey [3], the
success chance is either with or without a verification query. A
query has probability of producing response and probability
of response . If the response is , then the success chance
is reduced to
, while if the response is , the success chance
. Thus, the success chance if the adversary
is increased to
.
asks a verification query is
In the case of authentication queries, the theorem may not
imply the existence of a good query. This is the case if for some
arising from
sequence of query and response pairs
every optimal spoofing message has the property that for any
there is an
such that
.
This is the case for the onefold secure A-codes of Massey [3],
where any authentication query reduces the success chance from
to
.
Note that Theorem 4.1 is helpful as it provides the adversary
with a method to determine whether he should ask a query or
not: he simply checks whether there are good queries, and if
there are, then he is guaranteed to do better if he asks them.

Using an argument by induction on the number
and response pairs gives

of query

(12)
. Further, another induction, on the number
for all
of terms in the product, gives
(13)
for all
tions.)
Let
let
with

. (See Appendix for proofs of these equa-

be a sequence of distinct source states and
. Let
be the sequence of messages
for
. Then,
and since
,
we have
and
.
Hence,
. Thus,
the distribution
is uniform.
It follows that

and

. Since
and
is an integer

V. OPTIMAL CODES

, we have
. Thus,

We consider optimal authentication codes that satisfy the
with equality. We use an argument
bound
similar to Rosenbaum [7] and obtain a combinatorial characterization of such authentication codes analogous to that in
the message-observing adversary setting. The codes will have
minimum number of keys and limit the best success chance of a
spoofer with access to queries to its minimum (that is, satisfy
bound of Theorem 3.2 with equality).
If equality holds, then it follows by Theorem 3.4 that
for
and the proof of the theand
orem shows that
for
. Further, equality holds in Theorem 3.3 and so, for an optimal
(having the properties described above the statestrategy
is constant for all
ment of Theorem 3.4),
and
.
is independent of , it follows that
Since

and
.
Thus, the optimal authentication systems determine a combisatisfying
natorial structure. We may identify a pair
with an incidence in a combinatorial design.
The previous results show that an optimal authentication code
corresponds to a combinatorial design in which any query reare incident with a constant number
sponse pairs
encoding rules. Since
, the authentication code
is Cartesian and it follows that it is optimal in the message observing setting also. The authentication systems arising from
Reed–Solomon codes (or orthogonal arrays) (see [5]) that are
optimal in the message observing adversary setting also provide
examples of optimal codes in our query oracle setting.

(11)

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have given an analysis of authentication systems for an
adversary with access to oracle queries. We derived information theoretic bounds on the best success probability of an adversary using a strategy to ask queries and then construct a
spoofing query. This bound can be seen as a generalization of the
Simmons and Rosenbaum bound and is derived using the same
technique. The adaptive adversary, however, has the ability to
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influence the bound through his querying strategy as well as his
spoofing strategy while for a message observing adversary the
bound is only affected by this latter strategy. We also derived a
bound on the key entropy for an adaptive adversary with access
to authentication queries and showed that in this case for an
the key
authentication system with probability of deception
. This is similar to the known
entropy is at least
result for a message observing adversary.
We gave a combinatorial characterization of authentication
codes that meet the bounds and showed that optimal codes
(having the least success probability and the smallest number
of keys) correspond to orthogonal arrays. This is analogous to
the message observing case.
We gave a result to show that, in the query oracle model, as
long as there is always a good query, then asking that query is
helpful to the adversary.

Using Jensen’s inequality (14) for
at
and

with
, we

have

(15)
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 3.2: The following proof is a direct application of the proof used in [7] to the situation where the adversary makes oracle queries instead of observing messages.
We will use Jensen’s inequality for convex functions. A real
if
, for
function is convex on the interval
.
all
Theorem 7.1 (Jensen’s Inequality) [11]: Let
be nonnegative numbers such that
be a real function that is convex on the interval
. Then

We will first show that

This is true because using (15), we have

. Let
and let

(14)
and equality holds if and only if all

are equal.

The proof of Theorem 3.2 proceeds as follows.
Let
Now as the adversary spoofs optimally, we have
and so
Because

it follows that
is a probability distribution on
Now we have

and
.

The final step uses Jensen’s inequality (14) for
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Proof of (11): We show that

Now, for

for all
so that

, we have
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. Since

and because

,

, we have

and

Hence
and the result follows.
Proof of (13): We show that
Now

For

, we have

Suppose that

and

Thus

Now

where the sum is over
However, by Theorem 3.3,
all
, so that

.
is constant for

so that
and the result follows.
Proof of (12): We show that

For

, we have

, so

and the result follows.
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